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HUME, COMTE,
AND THE RELIGION OF
LE GRAND ETRE
Darian C. DeBolt

n the preface to his The Catechism of Positive Religion,
Auguste Comte claims, "Hume is my principal precur
sor in philosophy."* Now this fact, in itself, should
come as no surprise. It is well known that David Hume was one
amongst many of the figures of the eighteenth and early nineteenth
century who were intellectual influences upon Comte.^ What should
strike one as incongruous is that Comte makes this claim in a book of
this particular sort. The Catechism was intended to be just that—a book

' Auguste Comte, The Catechism ofPositive Reli^fon, trans. Richard Congreve, 3rd ed.(London;
Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner, 1891), 5. Hereafter, I refer to this work as C.
^ See, for example, James H.Dunham, The Religion ofPhilosophers (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1947), 274 and W. T. Stace, Religion and the Modem Mind (Philadelphia:
Lippincott and Crowell, 1952), 168-69. The Societe positiviste intemationale lists as other
influences Marie Franyois Xavier Bichat (1771-1802), Paul Joseph Barthez (1734-1806), Henri
Ducrotay de Blainville (1777-1850), Franyois Joseph Victor Broussais (1772-1838), PierreJean
Georges Cabanis (1757-1808), Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet
(1743-1794), Denis Diderot (1713-1784),FranzJosephGall (1758-1828),Jean-BaptistedeMonet,
chevalier de Lamarck (1744-1829), Georges Leroy (1723-1789), Comte Joseph de Maistre
(1753-1821), and Adam Smith (1723-1790). Of these, all were francophones except Gall who,
^though a German, practiced medicine in Paris and published his well-known (perhaps,
infamous) works on phrenology in French. Hume and Smith are the only anglophones.
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summarizing religious doctrines in the form of questions and answers
for training initiates into Comte's new religion. The object of worship
of this new religion was to be le Grand Etre. How was Comte able to
reconcile his religious project with Hume's famous claim at the end of
the first Enquiry: "If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or
school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract
reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any
experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No.
Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry
and illusion".^^ This is particularly curious since it is uncontroversial
that Comte accepted much of Hume's empiricism as well as his
rejection of traditional theological and metaphysical speculations. What
I will argue is that Hume exercised a major influence upon Comte in his
formulation of the concept of le Grand Etre, the object of devotion in
his new religion.
This is not an easy task. Comte read widely in a diverse variety of
fields. He seems to have had a horror of footnotes much like that of
Gilbert Ryle. Typically, the most you get from Comte is the bare
mention of a name. Thus, the investigator is left with the formidable
and inductively insecure task of comparing ideational formulations.
But this is precisely what I propose to do.
My inspiration came from reflecting on two articles written in a
minor skirmish over an interpretation of Hume's philosophy of
religion. In "Hume's Immanent God," George Nathan argues that
Hume uses the three major interlocutors in Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion to establish a positive doctrine.'* The doctrine is that
the world does have a principle of order and that principle is incompre
hensible, rational, and immanent.' According to Nathan, Hume
identifies this principle with Nature.' In his response to Nathan,
Charles Echelbarger argues that Nathan's interpretation, while

'David Hume,y4» Enquiry ConcemmgHuman Understanding,ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 211. The previous standard edition of this work is David
Hume, Enquiries ConcemingHumanUnderstandingand Concerning the Principle ofMorals, ed.
L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd rev. ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 165.
* George J. Nathan, "Hume's Immanent God," in V. C. Chapell, ed., Hume; A Collection of
Critical Essays (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966), 396-423.
' Nathan, "Hume's Immanent God," 422.
' Nathan, "Hume's Immanent God," 423.
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insightful, is mistaken/ Echelbarger concludes his paper with the claim,
"While Hume rejected Natural Theology, he did come to accept what
might be called a religion of Man-in-Nature."' Both of these interpreta
tions are crucial to my thesis. If Nathan is correct in his interpretation,
then my thesis, while supportable, is not nearly so strong. However,
if Echelbarger is closer to the truth, then my thesis is greatly strength
ened. All that I need to establish is that Echelbarger's interpretation is
a reasonable reading of Hume's text. Echelbarger may see something
in Hume that Comte saw well over a century before. It is not necessary
that Echelbarger's interpretation be the reading of the text.
Now, both Nathan and Echelbarger concentrate on interpreting
Hume's arguments in Dialogues ConcemingNaturalReligion along with
occasional quotations from the Treatise and the first Enquiry? Al
though I think that Echelbarger makes the stronger case for his
interpretation, rather than working through both their arguments in
tedious detail I wish to take a different tack. That tack is an examina
tion of some long neglected short essays of Hume to see what they
reveal. It is to that task that I now turn.

^ Hume and the Four Ancient Schools -5^
In early 1742, David Hume published the second volume of his Essays,
Moral and Political?^ Among the twelve new essays in this volume were
four with the following titles: "The Epicurean," "The Stoic," "The

' Charles Echelbarger, "Hume's Tacit Atheism," Religious Studies 11 (1975): 19-35.
* Echelbarger, "Hume's Tacit Atheism," 35.
'David Hume,Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,ed. Norman Kemp Smith (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1947) and A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J.
Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). The prior standard edition is David Hiune,
A Trestise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. 2nd ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1978).
"David Hume, Essays, Moraland Political,vol. 2 (Edinburgh: Alexander Kincaid, 1742). This
edition is designated C in David Hume, Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. T. H. Green
and T. H. Grose, new ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1889). More details may be found in
David Hume, Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary,ed. Eugene F. Miller, rev. ed. (Indianapolis:
Liberty Classics, 1987), xii-xv, 601-2. All references will be to Miller's edition unless noted
otherwise. Since I will be making numerotis references to these essays, I will designate the essays
in Miller'sedition as follows: "The Epicurean," Ej "The Stoic," S; "The Platonist," P; and"The
Sceptic," SK.
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Platonist," and "The Sceptic." Evidently, Hume was satisfied with this
suite of essays because they were republished in all the subsequent
editions of his Essays whether under the original title or under such later
titles as Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects or Essays,Moral, Political,
and Literary. A further indication of his satisfaction with these essays
emerges when we examine the variant readings in the later editions."
Hume is widely acknowledged as one of the finest, if not the finest,
English prose stylists of his century. Hume continually revised his
essays throughout his life, some quite extensively. Yet of these four,
"The Stoic" and "The Platonist" have no variant readings, "The
Epicurean" has only three minor variants, and "The Sceptic" while
revised more extensively, still remains largely intact. Given these facts,
Hume must have thought the four essays to be of some value. Since
these essays are not political in nature, that value, by elimination, must
have been moral.
However, I think that their value is as much literary as it is moral.
Certainly the two are not exclusive. Since each essay is named for an
adherent of each of the major post-Aristotelian schools of philosophy,
one might, for example, expect a scholarly exposition of these schools'
doctrines. But Hume in a footnote to the first of these essays disap
points this expectation.
The intention of this and the three following essays is not so
much to explain accurately the sentiments of the ancient sects
of philosophy, as to deliver the sentiments of the sects, that
naturally form themselves in the world, and entertain
different ideas of human life and of happiness. I have given
each of them the name of the philosophical sect, to which it
bears the greatest affinity. (EDS)
In this note, Hume clearly states the moral or practical purpose of these
essays. What remains unstated is his intent to treat this subject matter
in a literary manner as much as a philosophical one. It is important to
remember that Hume, in reflecting on his own career, states, "My love

" The list of variants may be found in Miller, Hume's Essays, (>17.
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of literary fame [was] my ruling passion."'^ In these essays, trope
trumps pedantry.
What I propose to do is examine one of the devices that Hume uses
in all four of these essays to achieve his practical ends, that is, the
exposition of four different weltanschamngen of the good life. This
device is his conception or, perhaps, conceptions of nature. When I
first read these essays by Hume, I was struck by the emphasis on nature
in all four. One of my first thoughts was that nature played a godlike
role in each of the essays.
My project here is not only to see what Hume has to say about
nature in his four accounts of the ancient schools of philosophy but also
to see if there is any variance among each of the accounts. The reader
should remember that for Hume nature is not the object of study in
these essays but rather a device used to accomplish his purpose, that is,
explaining the sentiments of the sects and entertaining different ideas of
human life and happiness."
A. The Epicurean: In this essay, Htune asserts the superiority of
nature's productions to those of men. "It is a great mortification to the
vanity of man, that his utmost art and industry can never equal the
meanest of nature's productions, either for beauty or value" (EDS). He
continues, "Art may make a suit of clothes: But nature must produce
a man" (EDS). Hume's point here is that because man is a product of
nature, then man can only be made happy naturally. "You pretend to
make me happy by reason, and by rules of art. You must, then, create
me anew by rules of art. For on my original [i.e., natural] frame and
structure does my happiness depend" (ED9). It should be evident from
this that Hume is using nature to refer both to the natural world and to
the individual species. Man's nature is a product of nature. Thus,
man's happiness can best be achieved by nature. "And let her [nature]
conduct the machine, which she has so wisely framed. I find, that I
should only spoil it by my tampering" (ED9). Nature has implanted
within man springs or principles (ED9-40). So, nature herself must
contain springs or principles. The way of nature is the way of pleasure.
"In vain should I strain my faculties, and endeavor to receive pleasure

" David Hume,"My Own Life," in David Hume,^« Inquiry Concerning Human Understand
ing, ed. Charles W. Hendel (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1955), 10.
" This is a paraphrase of Hume in Miller, Hume's Essays,138.
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from an object, which is not fitted by nature to affect my organs with
delight" (E140). Although there is material in this essay that provides
some basis for speculation, we do not actually get a very clear picture
of Hume's views on nature. Hume does make it abimdantly clear that
our species is a product of nature, subordinate to nature, and its
happiness can only be found within the context of nature. Note too
that man, like nature, is maker or producer even if not so skilled.
B. The Stoic: Because of the fierce contentions between the
ancient Stoics and Epicureans, we might expect some significantly
different views of nature between this essay and the previous one. This
fails to be the case in this essay. Hume begins by observing that nature
has endowed mankind "with a sublime celestial spirit" (S146). How
ever, we must exercise the "utmost art and industry" to meet our needs
(S146). By contrast, animals "have many of their necessities supplied by
nature" (S146). For example, nature not only clothes and arms animals,
but implants instincts by means of which they have the art necessary to
achieve their ends. Here, Hume characterizes nature as "this beneficent
parent of all things" (S146). Nature, however, has not been stingy with
mankind. "Thy kind parent, nature, having given thee art and
intelligence, has filled the whole globe with materials to employ these
talents" (S147). That intelligence must be applied to both perfecting
bodily powersand faculties and the mind (S147). Here, human industry
ought to be aimed at producing "the man of virtue, and the true
philosopher, who governs his appetites, subdues his passions, and has
learned, from reason, to set a just value on every pursuit and enjoy
ment" (S148). Hume continues to extol both the virtue of nature and
the nature of virtue.
But know, that nature has been indulgent to human weak
ness, and has not left this favorite child, naked and unen
dowed. She has provided virtue with the richest dowry; but
being careful, lest the allurements of interest should engage
such suitors, as were insensible of the native worth of so
divine a beauty, she has wisely provided, that this dowry can
have no charms but in the eyes of those who are already
transported with the love of virtue. (5153)
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So, Hume's description of nature in this essay does not really conflict
with his description in the previous essay. If anything, it expands upon
that description. Mankind has a special place in the world "with a
sublime and celestial spirit." The speciality entails certain duties
towards ourselves and others.
C. The Platonist: It is probably unsurprising that the shortest of
the four essays is the one on Platonism. One might even think that
nature coxild go unmentioned. Particularly, given the fact that in the
Republic (509d-511c), Plato grants belief and its objects, images, an
inferior epistemological and ontological status. Thus, images and
reflections are mere copies of the objects of sense. Hume does preserve
the distinction found in the Republic, but with some interesting twists.
Hume asks us to "compare the works of art with those of nature. The
one are but imitations of the other. The nearer art approaches to
nature, the more perfect is it esteemed. But still, how wide are its
nearest approaches, and what an immense interval may be observed
between them?" (P158) He goes on to note that
Art copies only the outside of nature, leaving the inward and
more admirable springs and principles; as exceeding her
imitation; as beyond her comprehension. Art copies only the
minute productions of nature, despairing to reach that
grandeur and magnificence, which are so astonishing in the
masterly works of her original. Can we then be so blind as
not to discover an intelligence and a design in the exquisite
and most stupendous contrivance of the universe? Can we be
so stupid as not to feel the warmest raptures of worship and
adoration, upon the contemplation of that intelligent being,
so infinitely good and wise? (P158)
But what is that inteUigent being deserving of our worship and
adoration? How are we to denominate it? Here, I believe, Hume is
deliberately ambiguous. The following passage amply illustrates that
ambiguity.
The most perfect happiness, surely must arise from the
contemplation of the most perfect object. But what more
perfect than beauty and virtue? And where is beauty to be
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found equal to that of the universe? Or virtue, which can be
compared to the benevolence and justice of the Deity? If
aught can diminish the pleasure of this contemplation, it must
be either the narrowness of our faculties, which conceals from
us the greatest part of these beauties and perfections; or the
shortness of our lives, which allows not time sufficient to
instruct us in them (P158).

I draw attention to the fact that when "beauty" is referenced to the
universe, Hume uses the word "equal." But when "virtue" is referenced
to the deity, Hume uses the word "compare." Furthermore, the
comparison involving virtue is not with the deity itself but with two
attributes of the deity, that is, benevolence and justice.
This contrast between the universe and the deity makes all the
more trenchant the comparison that Hume makes earlier between mind
and nature. Hume would have us
Consider all the works of mens hands; all the inventions of
the human wit, in which thou affectest so nice a discernment:
Thou wilt find, that the most perfect production still pro
ceeds from the most perfect thought, and that it is MIND
alone, which we admire, while we bestow our applause on the
graces of a well-proportioned statue, or the symmetry of a
noble pile (P157).
Hume asserts that the beauty and order of statuary and buildings results
from the minds of the sculptor and the architect. With many a writer,
the reader would expect the next step to be an argument from design,
but not, of course, from Hume. Hume asks, "Amid thy rapturous
applauses of beauty and order, art thou still ignorant where is to be
found the most consummate beauty? the most perfect order?" (P157-58)
Here the answer to this question is unequivocal—it is nature.
D. The Skeptic. Just as "The Platonist" is the shortest of the four
essays, "The Skeptic" is the longest. This should be no surprise given
Hume's own skepticism. In it, Hume reiterates some of the themes he
has already articulated in the previous essays. For example, concerning
philosophers he asserts, "There is one mistake, to which they seem
liable, almost without exception; they confine too much their princi-
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pies, and make no account of that vast variety, which nature has so
much affected in all her operations" (SK159). However, he does give
the reason for this superiority of nature—human epistemic impotence.
"Our own mind being narrow and contracted, we cannot extend our
conception to the variety and extent of nature; but imagine, that she is
as much bounded in her operations, as we are in our speculation"
(SK159-60).
Despite this epistemic impotence, we still can discern some things
about the power of nature. For example, "nature has infused into all
animals...the general appetite between the sexes," and "nature has given
all animals a like prejudice in favor of their offspring" (SK162). Even
the mistake that "negligent thinkers" make in believing that moral and
aesthetic qualities are in the object rather than in the mind is due to the
fact that "nature is more uniform in the sentiments of the mind than in
most feelings of the body, and produces a nearer resemblance in the
inward than in the outward part of human kind" (SK163). Where men
disagree on such matters, it is
By this diversity of sentiment, observable in human kind,
nature has, perhaps, intended to make us sensible of her
authority, and let us see what surprizing changes she could
produce on the passions and desires of mankind, merely by
the change of their inward fabric, without any alteration on
the objects (SK163-4).
Hume contrasts evaluative judgments with what he calls elsewhere
"matters of fact." "In the operation of reasoning, the mind does
nothing but run over its objects, as they are supposed to stand in reality,
without adding any thing to them, or diminishing any thing from
them" (SK164). So in the study of the relation of astronomical bodies,
"there seems to be always a real, though often an unknown standard, in
the nature of things; nor is the truth or falsehood variable by the
various apprehensions of mankind" (SK164). Thus, "though all human
race should for ever conclude, that the sun moves, and the earth remains
at rest, the sun stirs not an inch from his place for all these reasonings;
and such conclusions are eternally false and erroneous" (SK164). Hume
observes towards the end of the essay, "What a poor thing is even the
whole globe in comparison of the infinite extent of nature" (SK175).
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E. The Upshot; Hume's conception of nature does not change from
essay to essay. What he says about nature in one essay is neither
contradictory of nor inconsistent with what he says in another. Rather,
what he says about nature in any one essay either supplements or
reiterates what he says elsewhere in the four essays. In each essay,
nature is a device used by Hume to bring out a feature characteristic of
each school. So, in "The Epicurean," nature has furnished humans with
faculties suited to appropriate objects from which we can derive
pleasure. In "The Stoic," nature supplies art and intelligence to
humankind as well as the rough materials on which to operate.
Humans must develop the appropriate virtues in order to transform
those rough materials into objects which supply our needs. In "The
Platonist," nature provides that perfection of order and beauty that is
the model for humankind. Finally, in "The Sceptic," the extent of
nature humbles us in our pretensions.
In the course of using this device, there emerges a coherent and
consistent description of nature. Because nature is superior to us, we
are incapable of knowing all her "springs and principles." Thus, nature
remains largely incomprehensible. Hume finds in nature both beauty
and the most perfect order. Hume finds an apt comparison between
nature and mind. This, I believe, is his indirect way of claiming the
rationality of nature. Finally, the "springs and principles" of nature are
internal and immanent rather than external to the tmiverse and, thus,
transcendent. Despite all this, man still retains a special place in the
order of things as the possessor of a "sublime celestial spirit."

^ Comte and Positivism ^
Although Claude Henri de Rouroy, Comte de Saint-Simon was the first
to use the phrase "positive philosophy," it was left to his erstwhile
disciple Auguste Comte to give it substance. And substance he gave it
in his six volumes of Cours de philosophie positive (1830-42)." But

" Well over one hundred years after his death, we finally have an edition of Comte's works:
Sylvain Perignon, ed., Oeuvres d'Auguste Comte, 12 vols. (Paris; fidition Amhropos, 1970).
Volumes I-VI contain the Coun,volumes VH-X contain the Systhne de politique positive, and
volume XI the Catichisme positiviste.
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Comte's reputation has not fared well. One sure indication of a past
philosopher's status may be found in the standard histories of philoso
phy. Does the name occur in the table of contents or must it be found
in the index? Alas, Comte has been reduced to the index. Were it not
for the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle and the brief book by
John Stuart Mill, Comte might have even disappeared from the indices
of such works. Although logical positivism took the last part of its
name from Comte's philosophy, it is curious how few of his doctrines
it adopted. Mill's enduring reputation and his little book on Comte
have also played a major role in preserving at least his name as a
philosopher. However, few contemporary philosophers could tell you
much about his philosophy unless they are specialists. Thus, a little
background is required.
Comte was no less a systematic philosopher than his nineteenth
century German counterparts.'® The principal difference between them
is that Comte rejects idealism, but not the systemization of philosophy
and the other sciences. For all that, he rejects materialism or at least
materialism as he characterizes it. The systematic nature of his positive
philosophy is evident in the first few pages of his first major work. As
I noted above, this work was pubhshed in six volumes—a length
intimidating to all but the most devoted and ardent student. Such a
student was to be found in Harriet Martineau. She undertook over a
period of years to translate and condense the six volumes into two for
English readers." The translation was so popular and so admired by
even Comte that it in turn was translated into French as a more
accessible doorway into positive philosophy.'^ I shall rely in the main
on Martineau's translation.
" Mill had a what now seems humorous response to Comte's passion for system. "It never
seems to enter into his conceptions that any one could object ah initio, and ask, why this
universal systematizing, systematizing, systematizing?" John Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte and
Positivism (1865) (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), 141.
"Harriet Martineau, trans., The Positive Philosophy ofAuptste Comte,1 vols., 3rd ed. (London:
Kegan Paul, Trench, Triiber, 1893). In this edition, Martineau's publisher, in a not too subtle
bit of boasting, notes that her translation had sold two editions and required a third, whereas
Comte's original edition had not been exhausted at the time of his death. The publisher goes
on to observe that Comte in his annual catalogue of works substitutes Martineau's version for
his own. I have not been able to confirm this, but I also have no reason to doubt the claim.
Hereafter, I cite this work a PP.
" Charles Avezac Lavigne, trans.. La Philosophie d'Auguste Comte, condensee par Miss Harriet
Martineau (Paris: Dunod, 1871).
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Here, Comte articulates the law of three stages. It is perhaps the
best known doctrine of his philosophy. This is a law concerning the
development of human intelligence—a development which Comte
views as progressive, a perspective not unknown in the nineteenth
century. As Comte states it, "The law is this:—that each of our leading
conceptions,—each branch of our knowledge,—passes successively
through three different theoretical conditions: the Theological, or
fictitious; the Metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific, or positive"
(PP, 1,1-2). Comte characterizes the theological state as one in which
"the human mind, seeking the essential nature of beings, the first and
final causes (the origin and purpose) of all effects,—in short. Absolute
knowledge,—supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immediate
action of supernatural beings" (PP, I, 2). Comte characterizes the
metaphysical state or stage in human progress as a modification of the
first or theological stage. In this stage, abstract ideas are substituted for
divinities as the causes of phenomena. The final or positive stage is the
"fixed and definitive state" in the development of human intelligence
(PP, I, 2). In this stage, "the mind...applies itself to the study of their
[phenomena's] laws,—that is,their invariable relations of succession and
resemblance. Reasoning and observation, duly combined, are the means
of knowledge. What is now understood when we speak of an explana
tion of facts is simply the establishment of a connection between single
phenomena and some general facts, the number of which continually
diminish with the progress of science" (PP, I, 2). In the wording of
Comte's description of the third stage we may observe the clear
influence of Hume's theory of association.
Now this rather bare outline of the law of three stages provided by
Comte himself should not mislead the reader into thinking that he
provides a simplistic explanation of human intellectual development.
Much of the second volume of Martineau's version and a corresponding
bulk of the original Cours are devoted to an elaboration of the three
stages." For example, Comte divides the theological stage into three
phases: fetishism, polytheism, and monotheism. In the fetishist stage,
"Man conceives of all external bodies as animated by a life analogous to
his own, with differences of mere intensity" (PP, 11,155). In this phase,
the divinity is in the object itself. In the subsequent phases, there is
" The three last and longer volumes.
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greater separation between the object and the divinities or divinity. So,
in polytheism, there is a divinity associated with an object as its motive
force, but the divinity is no longer immanent with respect to the object.
Yet the divinity remains immanent to the world. In the final phase,
God becomes transcendent but remains the explanation of the world.
Of the several important contributions that this stage makes to the
development of human intelligence, Comte thinks that the liberation
of ethics from its subordination to politics is one of the most important
(PP, II, 237). Comte was not so naive as to think that there were sharp
historical distinctions among either the phases of a stage or even the
stages of human development. He states clearly that conflation of these
phases and stages "arises out of the unequal progression of the different
orders of ideas, which occasions the coexistence, for instance, of the
metaphysical state of some intellectual category, with the theological
state of a later category, less general and less advanced,—or with the
positive state of a former category, less complex and more advanced"
(PP, II, 154-55). An example of this may be found in his claim that, "It
was the metaphysical spirit which had wrought the transition from
fetichism to polytheism; and quite recently, from polytheism to
monotheism" (PP, 11, 250).
Despite Comte's recognition of the complexity of the relations of
the phases and stages, he sharply contrasts the theological stage and the
metaphysical stage in some ways. The two stages are similar in that
both seek some unitary final explanation of phenomena. As we have
seen, the development of the theological stage culminates in a belief in
a monotheistic God as the ultimate explanation. The metaphysical
stage starts with the attribution of causal efficacy to abstract ideas such
as those that Hume hsts, for example, "powerjforce, energy, or necessary
connection."^^ However, it culminates in the substitution of nature for
God. So, once again, there is a unitary explanation for phenomena.
However, they also differ markedly. "The first [theological stage] is the
necessary point of departure of the human understanding....The second
is merely a state of transition" (PP, 1,2). The metaphysical spirit uses
argumentation to point out the weaknesses and contradictions in the
theological stage—a stage that depends upon the exercise of the human
imagination. That spirit is mainly a critical and not a constructive one.
" Hume, 1st Enquiry, 135.
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The result of the metaphysical stage is the dissolution of the theological
one.
A matter which I have not addressed so far is that Comte associates
a particular polity or polities with each stage. This again illustrates the
systematic character of his philosophizing. Comte often makes
trenchant observations on a wide variety of subjects; this is just as true
in politics. The following well illustrates his talent along these lines.
Though intelligence must always exert a powerful influence
in human affairs, and though a certain convergence of
opinion is necessary to all association, and therefore to all
government, such supremacy of intellect in political govern
ment as the Greek philosophers desired can never be more
than a dream. The intellectual life is feebler than the affective
in our organism,...and mental superiority is too little under
stood and appreciated by the majority of society to obtain an
immediate and practical ascendancy. The mass of mankind,
being destined to action, sympathize most with organizations
of moderate intelligence and eminent activity. (PP, 11,214)
The theological stage culminates politically in monarchial forms of
polity. In the metaphysical stage, this form of polity comes under
direct attack. Comte sees in the first two stages an unresolved conflict
between order and progress. In the theological stage, the emphasis is on
order, but order restrains progress. Thus, the theological stage contains
the seeds of its own dissolution and the metaphysical is that response.
Now, Comte admired the theological stage because, among other
things, "it afforded the beneficent guardianship under which the
formation and earliest development of modern societies took place"
(PP, n, 9). He does not hold that same opinion of the metaphysical
stage. This stage is revolutionary and chaotic, but necessary because it
sweeps away the old methods and beUefs to make way for the positive
stage (PP, II, 254). One senses his lack of sympathy with this stage by
his attack on certain fundamental values of the Enlightenment. He
assaults in turn what he calls dogmas of the metaphysical stage, for
example, hberty of conscience, equality, sovereignty of the people, and
national independence. Clearly, Comte has no use for democracies. In
certain respects, Comte is a precursor of some aspects of postmodern-
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ism. I do not think that it is entirely an accident that Jean-Frangois
Lyotard refers to Comte, if only briefly.^®
At this stage, the reader might expect Comte to dispense with
religion. This is by no means the case. The Reformation, hke the
Enlightenment, is a major phase of the metaphysical stage. The
Reformation represents the Protestant phase of the metaphysical stage
while the Enlightenment represents the deistical (PP, II, 267). The true
character of the Reformation consisted in "two points of change which
alone have remained common to all sects [these were]were the breaking
up [of] the centralization of the papal power, and the national subjec
tion of the spiritual to the temporal authority" (PP,11,267-68). So, as
in politics, the metaphysical stage represents the dissolution of the old
order in religion as well, but without a new construction. The
metaphysical stage represents the triumph of progress over order. This
stage necessitated the third and last stage—the stage of positivism.
In the positivist stage, observation predominates over both
imagination and argumentation. The result is the loss of unity found
in both the other stages—the unity provided by God in the theological
stage and the unity provided by Nature in the metaphysical. The
utilization of observation requires the use of induction and inductively
derived laws. Comte's analysis of the sciences results in the identifica
tion and classification of the sciences. The classification is hierarchical
and based on a movement from the abstract to the concrete. This
hierarchy, according to Comte, also reflects the historical order in
which these sciences developed by passing through the first two stages
until they emerged as sciencesin the positive stage of their development
(PP, I, 15). These sciences are mathematics, astronomy, physics,
chemistry, biology, and, finally, social physics or sociology. Each of
these sciences has its own laws, and Comte rejects the possibility of the
reduction of this plurality of laws to a single one. Comte opines, "Our
intellectual resources are too narrow, and the universe too complex, to

" Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Post-Modem Condition; A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997), 12. An
insightful postmodernist reading of Comte's philosophy of religion may be found in Andrew
Wernick, Augtste Comteand the Religion of Humanity: ThePost-Theistic Program of FrenchSocial
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). However, Wemick gives no
consideration to Hume's influence despite Comte's own claims, such as that which I noted
above. In pan, this paper is intended as a corrective to that lack.
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leave any hope that it will ever be within our power to carry scientific
perfection to its last degree of simplicity" (PP, 1,14). The only unity in
the sciences consists not in their laws but in the positive method that
they all use. This method is important not only because it is a sure path
to knowledge, but also because "the Positive Method can be judged of
only in action" (PP,1,10). For Comte, scientific knowledge is the basis
for human action in the world. "From Science comes Prevision
[prewoir]: from Prevision comes Action" (PP, 1,16). The culmination
of that action, particularly of the last positive science to emerge,
sociology, is social reorganization in order to overcome the essentially
destructive effects of the second stage and finally unite order and
progress rmder positive philosophy (PP, 1,12).

^ Comte and the Religion of Humanity ^
Most interpreters of Comte see him as having two systems because
Comte himself called his later endeavors a second career. Mill, as much
as anyone, is responsible for this view.^' However, this should not
blind us to the intellectual continuities between the first and second
parts of his work. According to this interpretation, the first system is
stated in the six volumes of the Cours and the second is contained in
Politique positive ou traite de sociologie, instituant la religion de I'humanite
(4 vols., 1851-54). As I noted before, this work is presented in a more
accessible version in the Catechismepositiviste ou sommaire exposition de
la religion universelle (1852). Part of the reason for this interpretation
lies in Comte's articulation of the cult.
The full establishment of his new religion required a doctrine
(dogme), a moral rule {regime), and a system of worship {culti}.^ The
model for his new religion was the Catholicism of his youth. As Comte
has his priest instruct his catechumen, "Our sole object here is to effect,
for the new religion, a general exposition equivalent to that which
formerly taught you Catholicism" (C, 49). Throughout the Cours, we
see Comte's admiration for the Mediaeval church and its theological
constructs. The result was a cult that had seven sacraments {presenta" Mill, Augusts Comte,125.
" Wernick, Helicon of Humanity, 2.
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tioriy initiation, admission, destination, marriage, maturite, retraite,
transformation, and incorporation),a priesthood, a positivist calendar of
saints, and a worship focused on le Grand Etre or Humanity. The
calendar illustrates the degree to which Comte elaborated his cult. The
year consists of thirteen months of twenty-eight days divided into four
weeks. Each month and day is named after one of Comte's positivist
heroes. The last day of each week is also the name of that week. For
example, the eleventh month is dedicated to modern philosophy and
named "Descartes"; the seventh day of the fourth week of that month
is "Hume" (C, Table D). This new church was to be led by the office
of Grand-pretre de I'Humanite. Comte himself was the first office
holder.
Given that the goal of the first system is the reorganization of
society on the lines set down by positivist philosophy, I would argue
that the second system in which he introduces his new religion is
simply a continuation of that project after further reflection. Comte's
new religion was part and parcel of his task of societal reorganization
and reformation. The object of worship was not just le Grand^tre, but
mote specdxc^ylevrai Grand Etre. What is the difference? As I noted
above, Comte identifies le Grand Etre with Humanity. Comte initially
defines Humanity "as the whole of human beings, past, present, and
future" (C, 53). HKis isle Grand Etre. He then qualifies his definition.
"The word whole points out clearly that you must not take in all men,
but those only who are really assimilable, in virtue of a real cooperation
towards the common existence. Though all are necessarily born
children of Humanity, all do not become her servants, and many
remain in the parasitic state which was only excusable during their
education."^^ Thus, only those humans who contribute to "the
common existence" of Humanity are part of it. This is le vrai Grand
Etre. Comte even has his positive trinity: I'Espace as le Grand Milieu,
la Terre as le Grand Fetiche, and finally I'Humanite as le Grand Etre.
Comte's postulating such a unity as Humanity does not mean that
he renounces his belief in an irreducible plurality of laws. "In fact, laws
are of necessity plural, by virtue of the impossibility that notoriously

" Comte, Catechism, 53. The italics are in the original. Comte is none too kind concerning
"parasites." Of them, he quotes Ludovico Ariosto,"Venuto al mondosolperfarletame-" ("Born
upon earth merely to manure it:"). Satires, HI, 33.
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exists of ever reducing under the other either of the two general
elements of all our real conceptions, the world and man" (C, 113). As
Comte explicitly opines we must renounce all aspiration to an absolute,
external, and objective unity (C, 113). The unity is to be found in the
true Great Being is a subjective synthesis (C,113). Comte recognizes,
"Though the knowledge of the world presupposes man, the world could
exist without man—man is dependent on the world, but he is not the
consequent of it" (C, 114). Unfortunately, Comte only gives us a
negative account of man's not being a consequence of this world: "All
the efforts of materialists to do away with spontaneous vital action by
exaggerating the influence of the inorganic environment on organized
beings have ended in nothing." (C, 114). Comte recognizes that man
cannot live by intellect alone, but that the sentiments and passions are
a necessary feature of human existence. The positive sciences were not
capable of providing an objective synthesis of these features, so the only
possibility left is a subjective unity.

^ Conclusion 3^
There are some striking similarities between certain fundamental
themes in both Hume and Comte. Clearly, there are some striking
dissimilarities as well. Hume certainly had no intention to create a new
religion as Comte did. But neither figure was wholly anti-religious.
Both opposed theological speculations because such speculations were
not grounded in experience—a doctrine that Comte derived from
Hume. However, both recognize the priority of nature and of
humankind's dependence upon it. In this respect, Nathan is correct in
his interpretation of Hume in the Dialogues. Hume does replace a
transcendental organizing principle with an immanent one, nature.
What Nathan failed to recognize, but Echelbarger does, is Hume's
privileging of man. While humanity is subordinate to nature, man also
has a special place within the scheme of things. Hiune's characteriza
tion of humanity as having "a sublime celestial spirit" must have
reverberated with Comte's thinking as he planned for the reformation
of man and his society. Furthermore, Hume's brief discussion of Mind
in "The Platonist" may have inspired Comte to think that the only
unity to be achieved was that of the combined intellectual contributions
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of great men over the course of time—a subjective unity. It is then no
wonder that Comte included Hume's Essays among the volumes
necessary for a positivist's library (C, 30).
Furthermore, Comte recognized and accepted Hume's claim in the
Treatise that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions."^'*
Because for most men this was their condition, they were not fit to rule
themselves. Such a complex task was to be left to the experts, industri
alists and sociologists. The metaphysical stage had undermined the role
of traditional religion. The result was a gap in the affective lives of the
mass of mankind. In order to construct a new society, Comte recog
nized the necessity of replacing the old religion with the new. This was
precisely the role of Comte's religion. Nature did not provide the unity
needed for a new society. Science, as we saw, fails to provide such a
unity. Thus, a religion of humanity fills this role. It requires no
theological or metaphysical speculations ungrounded in experience.
What better to worship than the great who have gone before us and
their contributions to the advancement of humanity? Through this
religion, Comte and his priests were to guide the moral destinies of
their fellow man in his newly reconstituted society.

" Hume, Treatise, 266.

